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The problems confronting trial counsel in an aviation case are to a
large extent the same as those confronting counsel in any involved tort
case multiplied several times. The careful experienced trial lawyer about
to try an aviation case will take the same general steps in preparing his
case for trial that he takes in any tort case. However, he will likely find
that the amount of preparation required in most aviation cases to be enor-
mous. For example, in one case in which I participated there were ap-
proximately forty eye-witnesses to a mid-air collision from which only
one (1) person survived. Involved in the case was not only the question
of negligence, but the situs of the accident, and a number of intricate
legal principles. I would not say that a capable experienced tort trial
lawyer could not adequately try an aviation case which confronts him
for the first time but I would say that in most instances he will find that
he has embarked upon a new and uncharted course and one that will
require intense study and preparation before he walks into the court room.
To interview each witness, to eliminate the wheat from the chaff,
to select the best witnesses, to plan the method of procedure, and to pre-
pare a memorandum of law, represents in many instances a gigantic task
and one which is time-consuming. Fortunately, there are few air crashes,
but when they occur, their consequences are usually tragic and devastat-
ing. Many times, an experienced aeronautical engineer can help chart the
preparation of an aviation law suit and can link together an otherwise
puzzling chain of circumstances.
The last ten years has brought a considerable change in the type of
airplane litigation with which I have had contact. Ten years ago, most
of the law suits seemed to involve injuries received as a result of crashes
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or from turbulences. However, gradually and perceptibly, the type of
litigation has broadened. Lawyers are now instituting suits based upon im-
proper location of baggage racks within planes, defective seats, defective
steps or landing ramps. The more airplane travel the more claims of this
nature. One airline official has remarked to me that each winter his Com-
pany is flooded with nuisance claims on its Florida run, designed of course,
to pay for a vacation trip.
Within the last ten years we have seen the adoption by a number
of states of legislation covering suits against a non-resident owner and
operator of an aircraft involved in an accident within a particular state
as well as legislation which applied financial responsibility acts to air-
plane accidents.
There are some occasions when airplane accidents bring about suits
against both the federal government and an individual air line as a re-
sult of an aircraft collision. A suit against the government is, of course,
permissible under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but a jury trial is not
permitted by the Act and the law suit must be tried before a judge. A
common law right of trial by jury is always available to the claimant
against the air line. In some cases, attempts are made to consolidate the
matters for trial, but my advice to defendant's counsel is never to agree
to such a consolidation.
I have personal experience of such a consolidation and the difficul-
ties that it leads to. In 1949 a bad air crash occurred at Washington
National Airport as a result of which approximately forty law suits were
instituted against an air line and against the federal government. Only
two of them joined both the air line and the United States in the same
suit; probably because this was prior to the Yellow Cab decision in the
Supreme Court of the United States permitting the government to be
joined as any ordinary tortfeasor with another defendant. It seemed to be
to everyone's advantage to consolidate the cases for trial and most of the
attorneys entered into a stipulation providing for the trial of a test case
on liability, the measure of damages being reserved. I spent nine solid
weeks before a federal court on behalf of the air line involved and I wit-
nessed the impracticality and inadvisability of trying a jury trial in the
same court room and at the same time a non-jury trial was being heard
by the court, as it was in this test case, which was to determine the lia-
bility of the federal government in a non jury case and the liability of the
air line in a jury case. The jury, in my opinion, could not understand why
it could not decide the case involving the government, and I feel that it
would have held the government responsible if it had been so permitted.
During the course of the trial of this case, there were frequent quarrels
between counsel representing the plaintiffs and counsel representing the
government. As an innocent bystander to most of these disputes, I am
satisfied that they reflected to our disadvantage, particularly because it
was necessary for us to work reasonably close with the government, for
the reason that its vast resources were available in preparing the case for
trial, and most important the United States did not consider my client to
be in any way to blame for the accident. I am convinced that some ill feel-
ing was engendered by the arguments and quarrels between opposing
counsel which affected our chances.
The Civil Aeronautics Board makes a practice of conducting hear-
ings into certain aircraft accidents. Some of these hearings are public in
nature and are sometimes extended and time-consuming. I can remember
one such hearing following a very serious aircraft accident which brought
about the death of a number of persons, and which consumed a period of
ten days. The records of these hearings are published and are available
for examination by anyone. In the CAB file is usually found the names,
addresses and statements of all persons having knowledge or pertinent
information about the aircrash. Many times I have received inquiries from
lawyers involved in aircraft litigation in some locality far removed from
Washington. I have been asked to obtain certain information from the
Civil Aeronautics Board on some occasions and on others I have been
asked to check the Civil Aeronautics Board record to make certain that
the lawyer involved in the litigation had all of the information contained
in the CAB file. Invariably, we have discovered vital and important in-
formation in the files of CAB which was not in the possession of the trial
lawyer. This sometimes applied to the names of witnesses and other times
to statements given by witnesses. I cannot urge too strongly that anyone
involved in aircraft litigation, should check, or have checked, the investi-
gation file of the Civil Aeronautics Board and I mean by this that a per-
sonal investigation should be made and that it should not be left to corre-
spondence, because all too often, I have seen that the correspondence did
not bring about the securing of the complete record. I do not mean to
indicate any intentional failure on the part of the Government to send
the information to the inquiring attorney. I mean simply that in the
operations of our Government, there are human failures and inadvertence
which can sometimes react to the prejudice of the person relying upon
his belief that he had the entire record.
It is the policy of the Civil Aeronautics Board where testimony of its
investigators is desired in a law suit to require the party desiring the
testimony to write to the CAB requesting that the CAB permit the investi-
gator to testify in court. This reflects a modification of the CAB's original
policy which was to refuse to permit its employees to testify in court.
In some instances, the CAB would approve the taking of the testimony
of the witness so that it would be available in deposition form for use
in court. Where the investigator has testimony not available to a party,
the CAB will permit its investigator to testify in court. However, the giv-
ing of opinions by the investigator or employee are frowned upon and
usually will not be given voluntarily in court. In a few cases, the courts
have ordered the giving of such testimony. In Universal Air Lines v.
Eastern Air Lines,1 the question of the giving of testimony by such an
investigator was involved. There the investigator's deposition had been
taken pursuant to authority given by the Board, but when it was offered
during the trial, one of the parties objected to its admissibility because
of the availability of the witness for the giving of oral testimony. The
court ordered the witness to testify and he did so over the objection of
the CAB and gave testimony concerning his investigation of the accident.
Since the witness was a recognized aeronautical engineer, he was also
ordered by the court to give his opinion concerning the angle of collision
of the two planes involved in the accident. On Appeal the CAB filed its
brief as Amicus Curiae and asserted that the court should have regarded
the witness as unavailable to appear because permission had not been
granted by the Board, and further that his deposition should have been
admitted into evidence.
The District of Columbia Circuit Court stated that the trial court
should ordinarily receive the deposition of the CAB investigator, but con-
sidered the action taken by the lower court in ordering the witness to
testify as proper. The court further said that where the CAB investigator
is the sole source of evidence reasonably available to the parties, with
regard to the precise position and condition of aircraft after a disaster,
that it is incumbent upon the CAB to make his testimony available by
deposition or in person; and further, that if the deposition is not forth-
coming or is insufficient, the court has power to order his personal
attendance. The court did approve the position taken by the CAB that
it could not be required to produce its reports, orders, or private files or
to testify to the contents of such private papers. Finally, the court said
that the conclusion or opinions of the administrative agencies or boards
or any testimony reflecting directly or indirectly the ultimate views or
findings of the agency or board would probably be inadmissible because
they would tend to usurp the function of the jury. The court believed
that such testimony was inadmissible because it fell within the general
rule which excludes hearsay and opinion evidence. Query: Does this
decision exclude opinion testimony where the investigator as in this case
was qualified by experience and training to give an expert opinion? I
think not!
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 did not require that carrier
tariffs contain provisions of written notice of injury to the airline
within a prescribed period following an accident, or institution of suit
2 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
against the airline within a certain period of time. However, for many
years it was the practice of air carriers to file such rules tariffs and the
Board for many years did not reject them. There has been voluminous
litigation over the validity of the tariff limitation requiring written notice
of injury or death and institution of suit within a prescribed period and
there is no unanimity on the question of the validity of such regulations.
Finally the Civil Aeronautics Board concluded that the presence in the
tariffs of limitations on the institution of personal injury or death actions
constituted a trap to the unwary and consequently on November 10,
1954, (CAB Order E 8756) provided that commencing January 1, 1955,
all carriers should cancel provisions in tariff regulations which contained
any limitation or condition on the carrier's liability for personal injury,
death or property damage.
A number of interesting aviation cases have involved the Warsaw
Convention. The United States as one of the signatories to this treaty
adopted in 1929 made such treaty applicable to all passengers in inter-
national transportation subject to this Convention which limited total
recovery for accidents to 125,000 gold francs or $8,300.00 in United
States currency. All carriers of signatory nations in international trans-
portation are permitted to avail themselves of the provisions of this
Convention unless the damage is caused by the carrier's wilful misconduct
or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court
to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilful
misconduct. (49 Stat. 3020). Wilful misconduct has been construed in
American Air Lines v. Ulen,' as the wilful performance by the carrier
of any act with the knowledge that the performance of that act was
likely to result in injury to a passenger, or the performance of an act with
reckless and wanton disregard of its probable consequences. Under these
conditions wilful misconduct would exist. Although a number of cases
have been tried involving the Warsaw Convention very few have re-
sulted in verdicts in excess of the Convention limitations or in the finding
of wilful misconduct. Recently the New York courts have had occasion
to pass on several claims involving this Convention. In the celebrated
case of Froman v. Pan American,' the defendant conceded its liability for
the account prescribed by the Warsaw Convention, but denied any wilful
misconduct, proof of which would have permitted the plaintiff to make
an unlimited recovery. The trial in the lower court brought about a
verdict for the Convention limits, the appellate courts of New York
affirmed the case without opinion, and the Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari in this case. Several other New York cases have brought reversals
in suits involving recoveries in the lower c6urt in excess of the Conven-
2 186 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
3 135 N.Y.S. 2d 619 (1954), 137 N.Y.S. 2d 821 (motion to appeal granted), App.
denied, 308 N.Y. 1050, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955).
tion where the appellate court found that the Convention should be
applied because of the absence of wilful misconduct. Goepp v. American
Overseas Airlines, and Grey v. American Air Lines.'
Article 20 of the Convention exonerates an airline from liability if it
establishes that it took "all necessary measures to avoid the damage or
that it was impossible . . . . to take such measures." This article further
provides: "In the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier shall
not be liable if he proves that the damage was occasioned by an error in
piloting, in the handling of aircraft, or in navigation and that, in all other
respects, he and his agent have taken all necessary measures to avoid the
damage." (49 Stat. 3019).
On September 28, 1955 at the Hague, 26 nations executed a protocol
to amend the Warsaw Treaty. The United States has not as yet ratified
or signed the new agreement and it does not become effective under its
terms until 30 signatory countries have ratified it. The provision of special
significance and importance in the new convention is substituted Article
22 of the Convention which raises the limitation of the carrier's liability
from 125 thousand gold francs to 250 thousand ($16,600.00), but
allows for a higher limit where negotiated by special contract. It is inter-
esting to note that there is also included therein a provision authorizing
the awarding of attorneys' fees and other legal expenses in addition to
the amount of the limitation. The limitation provided in Article 22 under
the terms of the new convention shall not apply if it is proved that dam-
age resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, his servants or agents,
done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that
damage would probably result, provided that the employee was acting
within the scope of his employment.
For many years, attorneys in the United States have criticized the
Warsaw Treaty presently in effect and the limitations therein contained
of $8,300.00. What United States attorneys have failed to recognize and
realize is the fact that in a number of countries the figure of $8,300.00 is
a very large amount of money and to have obtained some signatories to
the convention required considerable effort. By United States' standards,
$8,300.00 and even $16,600.00 may seem low, but the situation must be
considered from a world-wide standpoint and if the proposed protocol is
ratified it will provide and allow a recovery for accidents occurring in
some countries in an amount which by the standards of that country will
be considered enormous. It is interesting to note that many nations have
adopted the Warsaw limitation or less for their domestic and non.
Warsaw claims.
4281 App. Div. 105, 114 N.E. 2d 37 (1953), 305 N.Y. 830, cert. denied, 346 U.S.
874 (1953), U.S. and Can. Av.R. 503 (1953), affirmed 227 F. 2d 282.
Aviation litigation is a comparatively recent phase of tort law. While
each year more and more persons are using air transportation as a means
of travel there are still many persons who have never been near or in an
airplane. Even those persons who frequently travel upon the large inter-
state air carriers know very little about airplane parlance. A lawyer about
to try an aviation case should realize that there will creep into the testi-
mony many terms respecting the operation of an airplane which a jury
will not comprehend. For example, the radio control of a plane involves
many strange terms; its operation on an airway, is new and foreign to
the average layman. The terms with respect to landing and take-off at
an airport are mysterious. The traffic pattern which a plane is required to
follow and the instructions given by the control tower all make the trial
of an aviation case most difficult. It is my belief that a jury will appreciate
and a lawyer will strengthen his case if he endeavors at the outset to as
clearly as possible explain and outline some of the aeronautical terms
which are expected to come out during the course of a trial. Then, during
the course of the trial when, as so often happens, the expert on the
witness stand indulges in the use of technical language, instead of a term
understandable to a layman, the trial-attorney should make certain that
the term is suitably defined. In a recent case, for example, all of the
following terms were used:
1. Air Route Traffic Control Center and a number of terms having
to do with Air Traffic Control.
2. Approach procedure.
3. Clearance to enter Traffic Pattern.
4. Control Area, Control Zone and Controlled Airport.
5. Final Approach.
6. Landing instructions, and
7. Visual and Instrument Flight Rules.
Picture the average jury trying to unravel the meaning of these without
suitable and sufficient explanation.
Within the past year I have had occasion to be involved in litigation
involving the explosion of an aircraft accumulator, a part of the hydraulic
system of an airplane used in connection with landing gear operations.
This case proved to be as complicated as any that I have ever been in.
First of all, the accident had occurred on a Naval base and the Navy
was the only one who had available to it the complete information as
to what had occurred. A Navy Board of Inquiry reached one conclusion
while another branch of the Navy, the Bureau of Aeronautics, reached
another entirely different and distinct. It was impossible to interview the
witnesses without the consent of the Navy and without permitting coun-
sel for the other side to be present. It was necessary to write to one branch
of the Navy for information; in turn, that branch would try to get the
information from another department; then, the information would be
sent from the second department to the first department and finally to me.
I was told by certain persons that certain documents and information were
not available only to find them turning up five or six months later. I
cannot say that the Navy was uncooperative, but I can say that I did not
get the cooperation that I really felt that I was entitled to until after
I had served subpoenaes on several high officials: from that point on all
was harmony and I obtained complete cooperation. In order to get a
proper grasp of the situation involved in this case, I found it necessary
to spend countless hours with engineers from my client's company and
also spent one and onehalf days at the plant where I learned as fully
as I could about the manufacture of the accumulator, its position in the
plane and its use. The finest investigation file cannot properly acquaint
the trial attorney sufficiently, to enable him to try this type of law suit
without his learning for himself, first-hand about the workings of the
materials involved.
Much has been already written and said on the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur and its application to various aviation law suits. Plaintiffs' coun-
sel contend that it should be applied in practically every case while on
the other hand the defendant lawyer denies in most instances its applica-
bility. Our courts recognize this doctrine as an exception to the common
law rule that a plaintiff must prove the defendant's fault and as such
they require plaintiff to justify the use of the doctrine by showing that
the cause of the accident was known, that the aircraft was in the exclusive
control of the defendant and that such accident was one which would
ordinarily not occur without negligence.
At first blush it would seem that the doctrine should be applied in
the case of a paid passenger for hire riding in a large transport which is
involved in an aircrash resulting in death to the passenger. However, let
us suppose there were many eye-witnesses to the crash who could testify
as to its cause. Is there any need for the application of this doctrine under
such circumstances? And take those situations wherein no one sur-
vives a fatal aircrash or those where no member of the flight crew sur-
vives. We must remember that an airplane in flight is subjected to many
unusual perils tied in with many types of weather conditions. In the
majority of aviation-passenger cases, in which res ipsa loquitur has been
invoked, the juries have returned verdicts for the defendants.' Another
reason today for the non-application of the res ipsa loquitur rule is the
availability to both plaintiffs and defendants of the C.A.B. file and record
which contains usually every bit of information obtainable concerning a
5 Orr, The Rio Revision of the Warsaw Convention--Part II, 21 J. oF AIR LAW
AND C. 174, 175-176 (1954).
particular air crash. From this information a claim or defense can be
readily prepared.
Lobel v. American Airlines' illustrates the abundance of information
available in an air crash case. The plane which crashed was enroute from
New York to Chicago and had made stops in Buffalo and Detroit before
crashing in Indiana. The court in an earlier opinion had ruled that an
instruction on res ipsa was not a proper statement of the law of New
York. At the retrial, the plaintiff did not rely upon this theory, but
sought to prove specific negligence in the maintenance and operation of
the plane, while the defendant introduced extensive evidence which
showed the condition of the plane, the repairs and servicing made and
given to it and the jury found for the defendant. In Davies Flying Service
v. United States, and Southeastern Air Service v. Crowell7 the court indi-
cated that the mere fact of an air crash did not give adequate grounds
for application of the res ipsa loquitur theory. Within the last few years
there have been other cases approving the doctrine.8 It is my opinion
that in most cases the plaintiff is unwise to rely upon res ipsa loquitur
particularly where a defendant will be able to explain how the accident
occurred or can demonstrate its freedom from negligence.
It may be interesting to you for me to touch upon the Federal Death
on the High Seas Act which provides a cause of action for wrongful
deaths occurring on the high seas more than a marine league "from the
shore of any state, or the District of Columbia, or the territories or
dependencies of the United States."' Under this Act the personal repre-
sentative of the decedent "may maintain a suit for damages in the district
courts of the United States in admiralty." With the great increase in inter-
national flights more claims for accidents on the high seas may be ex-
pected. The question arises whether recovery for death on the high seas
may be had under the state court acts or under the federal statute. A
California Federal Court has held that recovery could not be had under
the California Death statute, but under the Death on the High Seas Act
and, further, that the remedy was cognizable only in admiralty.' 0 Another
decision has followed this case" while an earlier decision took a different
view."
6205 F. 2d 927 (2d Cir. 1953), 192 F. 2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 945 (1952).
7 114 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Ky. 1953).
8 United States v. Kesinger, 190 F. 2d 529 (10th Cir. 1951), Backman v. Des Marais,
100 F. Supp. 1 (3d Div., Alaska 1951) affirmed 198 F. 2d 550 (9th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied 344 U.S. 922, (1953), Parcel v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. West Va.
1951).
946 U.S.C. 761 et seq. (1952).
10 Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
11 High v. Transocean Airlines, 124 F. Supp. 13 (D. Hawaii 1954), affirmed, 230
F. 2d 780.
12 Sierra v. Pan American Airlines, 107 F. Supp. 519 (D. Puerto Rico 1952).
